With its "Report on the State of the Nation 1971" the Govemment of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) simultaneously presented an extensive volume of collected studies. Drawn up by 50 experta, the report on the development in the two German states should contribute to facilitating political judgement and to sobering political discussion, according to Willy BrandL The author participated in the composition of the chapter dealing with the economic integration of the two German states with their specific allies. This paper is a summary of his report.
T he organisation of differing political and socio-econom~c systems after 1945 caused both parts of Germany from the beginning to go separate ways also in foreign trade and payments. But one thing they have in common must not be ignored: The FRG as well as the GDR are concentrating their external activities mainly on the countries belonging to their specific systems of alliances. The FRG's economic commitments to the countries of the Western alliance (NATO) are based on a great number of organlsations. Thereby in no instance do the different forms of economic cooperation coincide with the military allianceas regards the composition of members as well as the organisational framework. In the case of the GDR, however, an extensive congruence between the economic as well as the political and military alliance (Warsaw Pact) exists.
The EEC, the European Coal and Steel Community, and EURATOM, have in the meantime organisationally amalgamated into the "European Communities", which have proved to be the most important commitment of the FRG. These Communities are moving towards an economically fully integrated merger due to their members' political intentions and their immanent dynamics. This development of a supra-national common market with the character of a "domestic market" offers the West German economy the decisive prerequisite to realising the creation of enterprises with long-term international competitiveness.
The GDR, on the other hand, in community with the other socialist countries, follows another route within the "Council for Mutual Economic Aid" (Comecon). Typical of this course is the pronounced bilateral character of this cooperation, which, however, in partial sectors establishes directly, not only gradually, the final stage of integration. Thereby the advantages, which the GDR as Comecon's most industrialised country can realise in many bilateral agreements, are also opposed by disadvantages resulting from the relative backwardness of the partner nations. These economies do not offer the highly developed GDR the chance of utilising fully the advantages of the international division of labour-a fact which is due to their comparatively undifferentiated economic structures and their low consumer purchasing power.
In 1969 the FRG was the second export and import country in the world. Its share in total world exports of 1969 was more than 10 p.c., and its imports amounted to 8.8 p.c. The GDR's share in international ex-and imports came to 1.5 p.c. in 1969.
The FRG's institutional commitment has clearly effected the volume and regional structure of GERMAN PRISM its foreign trade. The share of the EEC-trade partners has considerably increased since 1958. As against that the large share of Comecontrade in the GDR's total foreign trade has remained almost unchanged since 1959.
In 1958, the first year after the Treaties of Rome, 46.8 p.c. of an export volume of $10.1 bn fell to the share of the NATO nations, 25.6 p.c. thereof was the part of the EEC member states. The remainder went mainly to the NATO members belonging since 1960 to EFTA as well as to the US and Canada. But more than half of total exports (53.2 p.c.) went to countries not belonging to the defensive alliance (see Table 1 ). Ten years later, after an increase of total exports by almost 170 p.c., to about $ 27 bn, the share of nations not belonging to NATO dropped to 40 p.c., while the part of the member states rose to 60 p.c. It is remarkable that this growth can almost exclusively be attributed to the increased shares of the EEC members (to 37.5 p.c.) (see Table 1 ). Excluding the US, all the other members of the alliance, although registering an increase in absolute terms, maintained only their position in the West German market or lost a little in importance. Within the EEC there was some change in so far as France became the biggest export market ahead of the Netherlands. The developments to be noticed in the FRG's exports also apply to its imports. However, in view of the structure of goods there are differences.
True, the share of goods procured in countries not belonging to the alliance in the FRG's total imports (49.2 p.c. in 1958 and 38.1 p.c. in 1968) is of about the same magnitude as the corresponding export values (see Table 1 ). But in 1968 imports were still composed of 66.9 p.c. food, beverages and tobacco, as well as raw materials. On the other hand, at the same time exports to these countries consisted of 90.2 p.c. of industrial finished products.
The cause for this development is to be found in the location of raw materials, on the one hand, and in the comparatively high food imports from developing countries and from centrally planned economies, on the other, where finished goods exports do not yet come up to the required technological and qualitative standards.
From 1958 to 1968 the regional structure of GDR exports has hardly changed in spite of an export volume increase by approx. 100 p.c., from $1.89 bn to $ 3.78 bn. The share of the Comecon countries in the GDR's total exports has stabilised itself at about 70 p.c. during the last decade (see Table 2 ). This applies also to the GDR's three most important trade partners within Comecon, the USSR (42 p.c.), the CSSR (10 p.c.) and Poland (7 p.c.). The share of the "capitalist industrial countries" including the FRG has grown slightly from 20 p.c. to 22 p.c. There does not exist any detailed and simultaneously complete reporting on the composition of trade between the GDR and the Comecon nations. Statistics reflect only roughly the commodity composition. With the GDR, exports of manufactures prevail, especially in the capital goods sector. The share of machinery and equipment in the deliveries of the GDR in its trade with the Comecon nations amounted to about 58 p.c. during
